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Abstract  
We analyze the determinants of the level of interest rates related to business loans traded on digital 
crowdlending platforms. We consider one of the leading platforms in France and collected original data 
on all the projects financed via this platform. On that platform, interest rates are set by the crowd of 
investors through a reverse auction process. We show that the loan characteristics and the scoring 
provided by the platform significantly influences the interest rate. However, though financial ratios are 
used traditionally to estimate credit risk, those ratios do not exhibit significant influence. Besides, we 
analyze the impact of the recent implementation of an automated auction mechanism. This implementa-
tion seems to have a large impact on both auction duration and on the determinants of interest rate. 
This suggests that use of a robot impacts on price and saving allocation on this platform-based credit 
market. 
Keywords: Crowdlending, Reverse Auction, Credit Risk, Lending robots 
   
1 Introduction 
 
Since the mid-2000s, the financial sector has experienced disruption from a major crisis which has ques-
tioned the traditional channels for the distribution of capital allocations. New technology driven-inno-
vation was seen as a natural alternative to and a new way of linking economic agents for financing 
purposes (Kremp and Piot 2015). The European compared to the United States peer-to-peer (P2P) lend-
ing market exhibits various characteristics that provide an original context. A key difference is the fact 
that historically, European financial systems (excluding the UK but including France and Germany) 
were strongly bank-based while the United States system originally was essentially market-based (Lev-
ine 1999, Mollick 1999). That institutional history helps to explain the recent and disparate growth of 
the crowdlending business in France. The credit crunch that followed the subprime crisis in 2008 and 
new banking regulation (Capital Requirement Directive in Europe) led to a sudden lack of liquidity for 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in France. Moreover and in contrast to market oriented 
systems areas, French securities markets were not sufficiently developed nor sufficiently accessible to 
SMEs which opened the way to P2P alternatives. However, growth in crowdlending especially in 
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France, up to 2014 was constrained by relatively unfavorable regulatory frameworks1, and a strong cul-
tural tendency for small investors and SME managers to be captive to banking facilities (BNP Paribas 
2016). 
Consequently, on the one hand, most individual lenders lack financial expertise and suffer from asym-
metric information, and on the other hand, platforms struggle to attract SMEs. Online borrowers/busi-
nesses exhibit heterogeneous and sometimes unconventional profiles uneasy to evaluate profiles (Pouey 
International 2016). That involves young age, immaterial assets, and innovations. The competitive land-
scape of crowdlending platforms in France is characterized by a variety of business models and has yet 
to stabilize around a particular modus operandi. For instance, platforms display different maximum loan 
amounts and loan durations. They also use different ways to determine the levels of interest rates im-
posed on each project. In some cases, the interest rate is established by an expert committee of the 
platform (Credit.fr, Lendix, Lendopolis, Pretup). In other cases, it is the responsibility of the crowd of 
lenders, and relies mostly on a reverse auction mechanism (Finsquare, Unilend). In that case, the plat-
form can be more or less of a digital vector of the interest rate determination: auctions bids can be free, 
covered by minimum and maximum rates, or oriented to use of lending robots (Unilend). The holding 
of SME loans by a population of unqualified investors raises certain questions. Traditionally, financial 
ratios and credit scoring are key variables in credit risk assessment, and the interest rate is an objective 
output of a financial analysis process. In a reverse auction process of interest rate determination by 
human crowds, interpretation of financial statements by unqualified lenders could lead to wrong esti-
mation of the counterparty risks (Mild et al. 2015). In order to assist lenders in their investment strate-
gies, crowdlending platforms provide a full set of financial and non-financial information on each pro-
ject. Unilend is the first platform to implement a lending robot (Autolend) in the French crowdlending 
market with the stated purpose of helping lenders to diversify their portfolios. 
The objective of our paper is to analyze the process of interest rate determination by a human crowd 
which financial literacy is uncertain and that has the opportunity to activate a lending robot to facilitate 
bid strategy. To study how these new crowdlending feature affect the lending process, we focus on 
Unilend, one of the largest and oldest crowdlending platforms in France. Following a brief literature 
review in section 2, section 3 develops an econometric analysis of average interest rates on Unilend, 
before and after the introduction of its lending robot. Our results shows that the two main artefacts 
available to human lenders on the platform - the score and the lending robot - are the main drivers of 
interest rate levels. Conversely, traditional financial ratios have little influence in the risk valuation pro-
cess.  
2 Related literature 
The digitization of financial services is being increasingly scrutinized by management and information 
systems (MIS) researchers2, along with the large number of papers dedicated to crowdlending. Gleasure 
and Feller (2016) provide an exhaustive analysis of the academic literature on crowdfunding. They find 
that crowdlending is the most popular crowdfunding research topic, and especially among studies using 
a quantitative econometric approach. In our paper, we propose to link the lending robot phenomenon to 
interest rate determination which links it to both a MIS and a financial perspective.  
According to Lebraty (2006), crowdlending platforms are particularly suited to the inclusion of lending 
robots. US crowdlending platforms pioneered the development of 3 lending robots, while, to date in 
France, only two platforms offer their customers use of a lending robot. These two platforms are Unilend 
with Autolend since 2016, and Wesharebonds with WeBot in 2017. Since determination of interest rates 
                                                     
1
 In France the so-called “banking monopoly” prohibits anyone other than a bank to purchase any form of loans. A new French 
regulatory framework for crowdlending came into force in 2014, and allows digital platforms to arrange up to €1 million of 
financing for businesses. 
2
 This is exemplified by the latest call for papers from the Journal of Management Information Systems: “Financial IS, Under-
lying Technologies and the FinTech Revolution”, and the ECIS2017 track “FinTech and the digitization of financial services”. 
3
 Cf. Forbes (12 Mars 2017) : « The Best P2P Lending Automation Tools for Investors” 
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is entrusted to the crowd, the result of the process relies overwhelmingly on use of automation. (Franks 
et al. 2016, Lee and Lee 2012). Böhme and Grossklags (2013) were the first to study the effects of 
introducing an optional lending robot into the revelation of information. They showed that the amount 
of “soft” information provided on a German P2P platform decreased after introduction of a trading robot. 
The main reason for this is that the automation (the robot) has the potential to change the focal point 
since those borrowers who use loan matching by lending robot know that adding soft information will 
not influence the lending decision. The novelty of our paper is that the platform studied does not use a 
take-it-or-leave-it model but rather an auction mechanism in which borrowers post interest rates. More-
over, our work focuses more on the link between lending robots and lenders’ expertise, and less on the 
learning process from the dissemination of borrowers’ information after introduction of the robot. 
In relation to the financial aspects of the lending process, financial and extra-financial variables can 
influence the outputs of the reverse auction mechanism (Herzenstein and Dholakia 2011). According to 
Realdon (2013), the term structures of credit spreads on corporate bonds and credit default swaps tradi-
tionally are linked to pro-forma financial statements. However, the rates observed on crowdlending plat-
forms can deviate from fundamental credit risk analysis because of the crowd’s lack of expertise (Franks 
et al. 2016, Mild et al. 2015). Zhang and Chen (2017) show the presence of herding behavior, and 
highlight the responsibility of the platform to inform, educate, and pre-select SMEs. Mollick and Nanda 
(2016) find significant agreement between the funding decisions of the crowd and those of the experts 
in the context of cultural (i.e. theater) projects. Zhang and Liu (2015) explore the herding mechanism 
and the extent to which each lender is able to process the listing information. They find evidence of 
sophisticated, rational herding. Dietrich and Wernli (2016) analyze the determinants of consumer loan 
interest rates in the Swiss crowdlending market. They find that loan-specific variables produce both 
statistically and economically significant results. But the study is based on a specific platform dedicated 
to consumption credit for individual households. The absence of any accounting information does not 
allow then to illustrate the possible lack of expertise and financial literacy previously mentioned.  
In addition to this lack of expertise, Mitchell et al. (2017) also stress the time constraint as another factor 
which can influence the information processed by the crowd. Indeed, credit risk management can be 
time consuming for non-financial experts or non-financial workers. In such a case, the time allocated 
for investment management is detrimental to the acquisition of other professional skills and thus to the 
personal carrier’s evolution. In order to mitigate this problem, the platforms can also integrate decision 
support systems – DSS - (Lebraty, 2006, Gleasure and Feller 2016). This innovation is relatively wide-
spread in the United States4 though it is more recent in France: Autolend was launched by Unilend on 
its platform in 2016. Wesharebonds also introduced a webot in 2017. Thus, the formation of interest rate 
will depend on the combination of the DSS and of the online transaction processing – OLTP – architec-
ture (Franks and al., 2016). Böhme and Grossklags (2013) have analyzed the impact of the introduction 
of lending robot on the use of information by the lenders within the framework of a German platform 
P2P. According to their study, introduction of the robot led to strengthen the role played by hard and 
non-expert information under the form of simplified signal such as rating as main drivers of interest 
rates levels. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the present analysis, dedicated to interest rates determination by 
crowdlenders, is the first attempt to directly link MIS and financial academic research. First, we analyze 
the extent to which the crowd is able to use the fundamental standards of risk valuation. Second, we 
explore the effect of introducing a lending robot. Our goal is not to demonstrate or explain herding 
behavior but rather to complement those bottom-up approaches by a top-down approach based on the 
explanatory variables for interest rates. We aim to determine the degree of crowd’s ability to use hard 
and expert information, and the influence of an investing decision-support system.  
                                                     
4
 Cf. Forbes (12 March 2017) : « The Best P2P Lending Automation Tools for Investors”. 
[https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliviergarret/2017/03/12/the-2-best-p2p-lending-automation-tools-for-investors-detailed-
analysis/#4cdb14061fde]. 
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3 Data and methodology 
Our methodology has similarities with the method proposed in Dietrich and Wernli (2016) and involves 
the collection of hard information on borrowing projects in the French Peer-to Business (P2B) lending 
market to analyze the main drivers of average interest rate determinations. We first present the Unilend 
platform and categorize the various types of hard information likely to be used by lenders (3.1.). We 
then elaborate on the data collection process, describe the data sample and present the estimation pro-
cedure (3.2.). 
 
3.1 Presentation of the Unilend platform 
Unilend is a French crowdlending platform specialized in loans to SMEs. Since its creation in 2013, the 
platform has raised funds for more than 400 projects to a total of over 30 million euros5. The borrowers 
are based in the French territory and show a high level of sectoral variety. With the exception of real 
estate acquisitions and loan repurchases, all of the projects can be accepted including cash refinancing 
and immaterial assets projects. Loans are repayable at between 3 and 60 months, and cover amounts 
from €10 000 to €500 000. SMEs have to prove they have been operating for at least of 3 years, and 
franchises are eligible. For each project, Unilend provides a credit risk analysis in the form of a rating 
from 1 to 5 stars. This rating is extracted with the following weighting: 40% from a proprietary algorithm 
that automatically collects qualitative and quantitative data, 20% based on borrowers’ financial data, 
20% based on industry-level data, and 20% based on judgments about the quality of the borrower’s 
management. Only projects that receive a minimum 3-star rating are allowed to enter the lending pro-
cess. Once the campaign launched, potential lenders determine (but do not disclose) their investment 
bid (€20 at least) and the lowest rate at which they are willing to fund the loan. The auction starts at the 
maximal interest rate (which is given by the platform considering both Unilend rating and loan duration) 
and continues as lenders bid lower and lower until either the end of the auction period decided by the 
borrower or once the lowest interest rate (also set by the plaform) has been reached. Lenders can update 
their bid at any moment during the campaign. At the end of the reverse auction period, the borrower 
selects the most competitive bids until the amount requested is reached. If the amount required is not 
achieved, the campaign is cancelled. Since April 2016, Unilend has offered to lenders the option to 
activate Autolend, a lending robot that can automate auction bids. In the simple version of Autolend, 
lenders can set the per project amount they wish to lend, and the desired minimum rate. In its advanced 
version, the lender with the help of a double entry table, can set different interest rates depending on the 
loan duration and the Unilend rating. 
The information available for each project includes hard information such as loan characteristics (auc-
tion length, loan duration, requested amount, rating) and key figures from the borrower’s financial state-
ment (available in a downloadable excel version for the calculation of ratios). Potential lenders also have 
access to soft information such as the nature of the project, and the history and objectives of the business. 
Additional soft and hard information can obtained by lenders from other sources outside of the platform 
such as social media, SME’s website, online discussion forums, financial and sectoral SME databases 
(generally on a pay-per-use basis). Thus, the lending crowd has to handle different sets of information 
which can be categorized into various dimensions: soft (qualitative and textual) and hard (quantitative 
and numerical), direct (within the platform) or distant (outside of the platform), unprocessed or pro-
cessed (with calculation), objective (fact) or subjective (opinion), expert (i.e. whose interpretation re-
quires specific skills such as financial statements), and non-expert (Unilend rating). 
It is traditional in corporate banking for credit risk valuations to be considered as influenced mainly by 
hard information (financial statements and financial performance compared to similar businesses in the 
same sector). Soft information is used to refine the valuation (Artis & Cornée 2016). Standard financial 
indicators such as debt, liquidity, and margin ratios are used to quantify the borrower’s default proba-
bility (Driga et al.2010). Thus, the main drivers of credit risk valuation which determines the interest 
rate are based mainly on hard, processed, and expert information. An important issue related to interest 
                                                     
5
 Source : Unilend, April 2018. 
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rate determinations by a human crowd is identifying whether the drivers of credit risk valuations are 
linked to the same fundamental analysis as banking expertise. We propose to test the sensitivity of in-
terest rates to traditional credit risk analysis proxies. Based on the results, we will explore usage of bid 
automation in the lending process since 2016. We are interested in whether it is significant and how it 
changes the dynamics of interest rates setting. In a second step, we compare the two samples before and 
after the introduction of Autolend. 
 
3.2 Data description 
We collected data on the Unilend platform and observed all the projects launched on that platform (from 
December 2013 to June 2017). For each project, we observed i) lender-specific characteristics (source: 
Unilend platform); ii) borrower-specific financial information (source: Diane database), and iii) sector-
specific financial information (source: Diane database). To perform the econometric analysis, we ex-
cluded projects from those firms whose financial characteristics were not observable in the Diane data-
base. We excluded firms whose crowdlending campaigns were successful but which eventually chose 
not to issue the loan, and excluded also firms that did not meet their financial target and so were not 
granted a loan. We are left with 204 observations. Collected data are defined in Table 1.  
 Variable name Variable description 
avintrate  Average (post campaign) interest rate, in percentage 
principal  Financial Target (i.e. loan size), in thousand € 
duration  Loan duration, in months 
lendersnb  Number of selected lenders 
rtUnilend  Unilend rating, from 3 to 5 
tu_m_refy  Borrower's annual turnover in the reference year, in million € 
auction_time  Actual duration of the auction process, in days 
repaycap  Borrower's repayment capacity 
fibal  Borrower's financial balance ratio 
opmargin  Operating margin 
avgap_ocf  Gap between the borrower's operational cash flow and the sector's average operational 
cash flow 
avgap_opmar-
gin  
Gap between the borrower's operating margin and the sector average operating margin 
Table 1.  Variable description 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample before and after introduction of Autolend. The 
descriptive statistics suggest that Autolend induced changes in the behavior of lenders and borrowers. 
On average, post-Autolend auction duration reduced by two-third; thus, after introduction of Autolend 
borrowers can expect lenders to react more quickly. In Autolend-assisted crowdlending campaigns, one 
in two projects achieves its target in less than one day(<1 day). Therefore, assuming a sufficiently high 
number of lenders, borrowers have less need to set a long auction duration in the belief that greater 
lender competition will translate into lower interest rates. 
Second, all other things being equal, the number of lenders per project almost doubled after the intro-
duction of Autolend (427.25 vs. 844.56). Lenders who prefer manual input mode need to log on to the 
platform in order to adjust their bids in the final minutes before the auction closes (late bidding strategy). 
Automatic lending removes this constraint and makes the auction process more attractive.  
Autolend seems also to have a negative impact interest rates (8.29% vs. 6.68%). We performed a mean 
difference test. The t-statistics assuming either equal or unknown variance reveal that the mean differ-
ence is statistically significant (resp. t=9.83 or 9.75, 1% precision level). The competition effect associ-
ated with a larger number of lenders is a plausible explanation for this difference. However, this expla-
nation does not account for the variation in other factors. The econometric analysis allows us to control 
for the impact of these factors. 
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 Prior to Autolend introduction After Autolend introduction 
Variable name N Mean Std. Min Max N Mean Std. Min Max 
Avintrate 244 8.29 1.40 4 9.9 113 6.68 1.38 4 9.3 
Principal 244 78.78 56.91 10 400 113 74.66 68.86 10 300 
Duration 244 43.54 12.74 6 60 113 36.29 16.94 6 60 
Lendersnb 235 427.25 270.71 98 1867 104 844.58 595.07 141 2955 
rtUnilend 243 3.38 0.48 3 4.5 113 3.32 0.36 3 4.5 
tu_m_refy 244 1.96 5.96 0 83.53 113 1.21 1.69 0 13.22 
auction_time 233 12.08 7.42 2 45 108 3.94 5.52 1 28 
Repaycap 167 2.93 5.14 -14.6 46.23 54 5.25 9.88 0 66.45 
Fibal 167 3.91 17.70 0.50 221.67 54 2.841 2.391 0.86 13.27 
Opmargin 168 11.74 11.21 -9.11 72.22 54 7.43 12.74 -72.34 28.858 
avgap_ocf 162 1.29 6.74 -65.9 38 53 4.19 8.77 -9.37 27.85 
avgap_opmargin 163 1.19 4.23 -29.6 27.1 53 2 3.07 -3.85 8.98 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics6 
 
 
3.3 Econometric analysis 
We performed ordinary least square (OLS) analysis on the following relationship: 
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where dependent and independent variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
To assess the impact of Autolend introduction, we performed OLS on two different samples (prior to 
and after Autoled introduction). Results are presented in section 4. We introduced duration² to enable 
identification of non linear effects as yield curves typically exhibit a concave shape7. We also introduced 
a squared term for auction_time since the effect of auction duration on interest rate may not be mono-
tonic. On the one hand, a longer duration may reinforce competition between lenders and lower the 
average final interest rate. On the other hand, some lenders may be deterred to bid because of a long 
duration since lender selection by the platform and loan repayments should begin only after the auction 
period. All things else equal, this may have a negative impact on the number of lenders interested in the 
project. Introducing a non linear term enables identification of those effects. We also conducted several 
robustness checks based on alternative sets of independent variables. These confirm the results. In Ap-
pendix, we also provide estimates on the whole sample (with autolend defined as a dummy variable, 1 
if autolend is available to lenders, 0 else).  In Appendix, we also provide estimates on the whole sample 
using variable $automate$ as a co-factor. These estimate enable a general assessment of the effect of 
Autolend introduction - as measured by the autolend variable - on the average level of interest rates. 
Unlike the subsample analysis, this assumes that the role played by other exogenous variables is constant 
whatever the period. 
                                                     
6
 The number of observations changes due to missing variables for some observations. 
7
 See anecdotal evidence on US on https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-
rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield, last consulted April 2018, 9th. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Prior to Autolend introduction  
Table 3 presents the results of the econometric analysis with the endogenous variable the interest rate 
level (in % points).  Column (a) considers the situation before the introduction of Autolend. We observe 
first that the coefficients of all the project-specific variables exhibit the expected signs. A marginal in-
crease in the loan duration (ranging between 6 and 60 months) has a positive impact on the interest rate, 
with the coefficient of the variable duration x duration showing that this effect is not linear with respect 
to duration. This is in accordance with the yield curve commonly observed in financial markets. The 
loan size also affects the interest rate positively. Both effects can be explained by an increase in the risk 
associated to longer loan duration or larger loan size. 
 
 Prior to Autolend introduction (a) After Autolend introduction (b) 
 Average interest rates Average interest rates 
principal 0.0121***  (0.00226) 0.0155    (0.0103) 
duration 0.193***   (0.0354) 0.0590 (0.0435) 
duration x duration -0.00182*** (0.000418) -0.000210 (0.000610) 
lendersnb -0.00128** (0.000468) 0.000461 (0.000729) 
rtUnilend -0.469** (0.162) -1.159* (0.499) 
tu_m_refy -0.0267 (0.0265) -0.0823 (0.0757) 
auction_time 0.138*** (0.0372) -0.0542 (0.108) 
auction_time x auction_time -0.00368*** (0.000968) -0.00270 (0.00342) 
repaycap -0.00481 (0.0149) -0.0452 (0.0247) 
fibal -0.000686 (0.00408) -0.00519 (0.0627) 
opmargin 0.00133 (0.00658) -0.0219 (0.0186) 
avgap_ofc 0.0104 (0.0111) 0.0180 (0.0329) 
avgap_opmargin -0.00157 (0.0185) 0.0233 (0.0781) 
constant 3.669*** (0.956) 7.570*** (1.842) 
N 156 48 
R2 0.589 0.734 
Table 3. Regression results. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
Precision level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The coefficients of the crowdlending campaign-specific variables exhibit less expected impacts. On the 
one hand, an increase in the duration of the auction process and/or in the number of lenders may induce 
higher competition among sellers, and in turn, induce a decrease in interest rate, all things being equal. 
On the other hand, an increase in the duration of the auction process may discourage some lenders from 
bidding for that project since the feedback on their bid will be delayed which will delay the loan start 
date should their offer be accepted. Our results show a non-linear effect (inverse U shaped relationship). 
However, we should stress that we are observing only the post-campaign number of lenders (i.e. the 
lenders selected by the borrower after the auction process ended). Therefore, we are not able to assess 
the magnitude of the selection process (i.e. the ratio between the ex-ante and ex post numbers of bidders). 
Also, we cannot control for the amount of the average bid. For these reasons, we use these variables 
only as control variables.   
Unilend ratings exhibit the expected impact of a higher rating resulting in a lower interest rate. The 
magnitude of this effect is interesting: one additional “star” (i.e. point) results in a 0.46 percentage point 
saving on nominal interest rates. However, it should be noted that none of the financial ratios or indica-
tors, whether borrower- or sector-specific has a significant impact on the interest rate. This conclusion 
Darmon et al. / Lending robots and interest rates determination 
Twenty-Sixth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS2018), Portsmouth,UK, 2018 8 
 
is robust to many alternative specifications. For example, we used alternative financial indicators and 
were unable to detect any significant effects. We replaced the operating profit margin or financial bal-
ance ratios by the repayment capacity ratio to account for the borrower’s financial strength. Similarly, 
we used the ratio of the overall gross margin instead of the operating profit margin, and the impact of 
the interest rate on turnover was used to substitute for the financial balance ratio. 
In addition, there may be some multi-collinearity among the explanatory variables e.g. among the 
Unilend rating and the financial variables. To check this, we ran alternative regressions where we 
dropped the Unilend rating. We were unable to infer a significant (with a minimum 10% precision level) 
relationship between the financial variables and the interest rate. 
We also used sector-specific variables. We introduced these explanatory variables either as independent 
variables (avgap_ofc and avgap_opmargin), or as new variables measuring the gap between the bor-
rower’s and the sector’s ratio. In both cases, we were unable to identify any significant effect.  
Finally, we introduced the borrower’s AFDCC rating8, as explanatory variables - both with and without 
the other financial variables. Introducing the AFDCC rating affects only the significance of rtUnilend 
score. It might be that Unilend uses some part of the AFDCC score in its own rankings, although the 
coefficient of the AFDCC rating is never statistically (<10% precision level) significant. 
There are two possible explanations for the weak impact of the financial variables on the interest rate 
level. On the one hand, these ratios can be computed using data from the borrower’s balance sheet and 
profit and loss accounts, and these data are available on the Unilend platform. Therefore, we can hy-
pothesize that lenders face either time or cognitive restrictions to inferring information from these data. 
On the other hand, we can conjecture that bidders rely heavily on the Unilend rating which they perceive 
as a credible and synthetic measure of project quality since bidders delegate authority to Unilend. This 
does not exclude other plausible explanations. For instance, it could be conjectured that some bidders 
are characterized by low levels of risk aversion and/or are interested in the fun aspects of the auction 
mechanism. Finally, we cannot exclude herding behavior. Such behavior is common among agents to 
deal with uncertainty, and are discussed in Herzenstein et al. (2011) in the context of the Prosper P2P 
lending platform. To explore this aspect in more detail would require less aggregated data. However, 
anecdotal evidence from observation of the Crowdlending.fr discussion forum, and other dedicated plat-
forms, suggests that these platforms help agents to coordinate over risk assessment. These forums are 
likely to enhance mimetic behaviors. Nevertheless, the lack of correlation between interest rates and 
financial ratios is a preoccupying result. As a matter of fact, Emekter et al. (2015) found that credit 
grade, debt-to-income ratio, FICO score (an equivalent of the French AFDCC rating) and revolving line 
utilization play an important role in loan defaults.  
 
4.2 After Autolend introduction  
 
To assess the impact of the introduction of Autolend on interest rates, we performed another regression 
using observations on projects where Autolend was available. The results are presented in Column (b) 
table (3) and should be compared with the results in column (a). After Autolend was introduced, the 
Unilend score becomes the unique significant explanatory variable. Loan duration and loan size have 
no impact. Similarly, neither the duration of the Crowdlending campaign nor the number of lenders has 
any impact on the interest rate. By introducing deterministic lending rules, introduction of Autolend 
changes these two explanatory variables and thus, their impact on the interest rate level. 
The magnitude of the Unilend ranking coefficient also increases (-1.159 vs. -0.469). This suggests that 
the Autolend mechanism induces lenders to rely more (compared to the prior Autolend situation) on the 
Unilend ranking. However, note that the degree of significance of this coefficient is lower – most likely 
caused by the difference in the two sample sizes. 
                                                     
8
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Overall, it seems that the introduction of Autolend has had a strong impact on bidding behavior. First, 
it led to an increase in the role of the Autolend ranking. Second, those behaviors are less easy to explain 
using the previous set of variables. However, this result needs to be balanced. On the one hand, the 
introduction of Autolend is relatively recent, and so the sample size is restricted. Second, a few months 
after Autolend was implemented, Unilend introduced price ceiling and price floor constraints on bidders. 
 
4.3 Policy implications 
 
Our results highlight the tendency of the crowd to use financial ratings as a support decision artefact and 
moreover, the tendency to use lending robots as a substitute decision artefact. These results raise the 
question of the financial literacy of the households and their ability to evaluate financial risks. The level 
of financial education of the French population itself is considered to be very low in comparison to other 
countries (International Allianz Pension Papers 1/2017). In addition, the disparity of accounting infor-
mation of small businesses can increase the risks of informational asymmetry. In accordance with the 
work of Franks et al. (2016), substitution between the lenders and the platform in the information pro-
cessing and the tendency of the lenders to use heuristic simplifications would not generate any problem 
of consistency since the rating provided by the platform involves an unbiased and sufficiently granular 
degree of discrimination among projects. However, according to Bellefamme et al. (2015), crowdlend-
ing platforms could be encouraged to hide part of their private information in order to preserve the 
attractiveness of potential borrowers. According to Serrano-Cinca and al. (2015), use of a proprietary 
algorithm is more expensive for a platform than relying on an outsourced rating. Insofar the role of the 
rating is crucial in the lending process and also in the Autolend pre-settings. Therefore, a natural exten-
sion to this study is to analyse the predictive power of the rating on a P2B lending platform. In that 
sense, there is a need to investigate the opportunity to extend the current regulatory framework of credit 
rating agencies (Directive 2013/14/EU in the European Union) to proprietary credit rating of lending 
platforms since this regulation seeks to reduce conflicts of interest and make agencies more accountable 
and transparent for their actions. Similarly, actual financial market regulation may also be transposed to 
crowdlending platforms. For instance, recent regulatory initiatives concerning algorithmic trading on 
financial markets such as Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2 (MIFID2). MIFID2 ensures that 
a firm engaging in proprietary algorithmic trading cannot be used for any purpose that is contrary to 
market fairness. To implement this objective, the directive requires a firm to provide details of the con-
trols and systems and, in relation to decision support systems, a description of the strategies. Develop-
ment of crowdlending platforms and of lending robots raises similar regulatory issues. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper has analyzed the impact of introducing a computerized decision support system (i.e. a robot 
advisor) on the price setting mechanism and outcome of an online crowdlending platform. We consid-
ered a leading French crowdlending platform which introduced this type of robot (Autolend) in the 
context of an auction-based price-setting mechanism. Autolend enables bidders (lenders) to adjust bids 
automatically (proxy bidding). It also helps them to set a bid specific to the characteristics of the pro-
ject/borrower. We contrasted the situations before and after the introduction of Autolend. Prior to the 
introduction of Autolend, we found that the level of (nominal) interest rates was correlated significantly 
to project-specific characteristics such as loan size and loan duration. We found that lenders seem to 
give weights to information that is straightforward to process, and rely on the platform to process more 
complex information (e.g. financial ratios and indicators). On the one hand, despite this information 
being accessible from the platform’s website, various financial indicators do not influence the interest 
rate level. In contrast, the project’s ranking available on the platform has a significant influence. We can 
infer that users (i.e. lenders) give priority to synthetic and non-expert information (Unilend rating) rather 
than investing time and cognitive resources in computing their own financial ratios.  
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As the number of per project lenders shows, Autolend seems to have met users’ expectations. The in-
fluence of the platform’s rating and the computerized decision support system seems to have been mag-
nified. That is, implementation of Autolend seems to reinforce the weight attached by the crowd to the 
platform’s scoring. We can consider lenders to be a heterogeneous population mixing experts (financial 
analysts, etc.) with inexpert bidders. In the case of high skilled agents, it would seem plausible that the 
sudden acceleration of the auction process –duration of the auction process fell by 75% after implemen-
tation of Autolend–prevented them from processing the information on their own since this takes time, 
and risks the target being reached before they come to a decision. If this hypothesis were confirmed, it 
would mean that the introduction of computerized decision support has an influence also on those agents 
that may not (initially) be willing to use it. 
One possible issue is learning. In the current version of this paper, we distinguished two subperiods 
(before and after Autolend introduction) tough the first subperiod has a relatively long duration. It is 
characterized by the introduction of the Unilend platform, and more generally of crowdlending platforms 
in France. Therefore, we could expect agents (lenders, borrowers) to have learned about the implemen-
tation of the platform and about the efficiency of their bidding and lending strategies. Though, since 
average level of interest rates in France has changed over the whole period, there is also a need to control 
for that. The same issue arises post-Autolend introduction. In a future version of this work, we will 
include both issues both as robustness checks and to investigate the potential effects of learning. 
This argument provides support for an observed trend in the crowdlending industry i.e. a switch from 
an auction based price setting mechanism (with a high latitude for agents to set their price) to a con-
strained or fixed price setting mechanism based on a computerized decision support system (which gives 
less latitude to users). If such a trend were confirmed, it would suggest some equivalence between the 
crowdlending and B2C e-commerce industries: many players in the B2C e-commerce industry started 
by employing auction-based business models (e.g. EBay in the US and EU). While these price-setting 
mechanisms still exist, they are becoming less widespread and popular. This switch has been attributed 
to the characteristics of auction based price setting mechanisms. These mechanisms may exhibit some 
“fun” features. However, those benefits seem transitory compared to the long-lasting transaction costs; 
bidders need to monitor the bids of other bidders in order to adjust their bidding strategies. In the case 
of the crowdlending industry, there is an opportunity cost associated to delayed financial investment. 
These types of arguments may be invoked by crowdlending platforms when designing their platforms’ 
rules. Our analysis suggests that changing the rules (i.e. introducing computerized design support) is far 
from neutral for bidders’ strategies and outcomes. 
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